The Indispensable Partnership
The Abu Dhabi-United States relationship is the most consequential security partnership in the Gulf outside the Saudi-American alliance — and in several measurable dimensions, it is more operationally integrated. The relationship spans defence cooperation worth tens of billions of dollars, active military basing, missile defence deployment, intelligence sharing at the highest classification levels, and bilateral investment flows that create deep economic interdependencies. Understanding this partnership is not optional for anyone assessing Abu Dhabi’s risk profile, its economic trajectory, or its capacity to execute on Vision 2030.
The relationship is also under strain. The rise of US-China technology competition has placed Abu Dhabi’s multi-vector foreign policy under pressure, particularly regarding artificial intelligence cooperation and semiconductor access. Investment screening mechanisms in Washington increasingly scrutinise Gulf sovereign wealth fund activity. And the bipartisan consensus that has supported the partnership for four decades shows signs of erosion on specific issues, even as the structural foundations remain intact.
Defence Cooperation and Arms Sales
The defence relationship between Abu Dhabi and the United States is anchored in arms sales that cumulatively exceed $25 billion. The UAE — with Abu Dhabi as the dominant defence policy actor — has purchased F-16 fighter aircraft, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missile systems, precision-guided munitions, and a range of advanced military hardware that makes its armed forces among the most capable in the Middle East relative to population size.
The proposed sale of F-35 stealth fighters, announced in 2020 as part of the Abraham Accords framework, became a test case for the tensions embedded in the relationship. The $23 billion package — which included F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, MQ-9B Reaper drones, and advanced munitions — was contingent on Abu Dhabi meeting technology security requirements that ultimately proved difficult to reconcile with the emirate’s existing technology partnerships, particularly with Chinese firms. The deal was effectively suspended, with both sides publicly maintaining that discussions continued while privately acknowledging that the conditions for completion remained unmet.
The F-35 episode illustrates a structural reality: Abu Dhabi’s access to the most advanced American military technology is conditional on alignment with US technology security requirements. This conditionality creates a direct linkage between Abu Dhabi’s China technology relationships and its US defence procurement options — a linkage that the emirate’s leadership finds constraining but has ultimately accommodated in specific cases.
Beyond headline weapons systems, the defence relationship includes joint training, military exercises, interoperability programmes, and professional military education exchanges. UAE officers train at American military institutions. American military advisors support UAE force development. The relationship produces a level of operational integration that creates institutional bonds extending beyond any particular administration or policy cycle.
Al Dhafra Air Base
Al Dhafra Air Base, located approximately 32 kilometres south of Abu Dhabi city, hosts a significant US military presence including fighter aircraft, reconnaissance platforms, refuelling tankers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The base has served as an operational hub for US air operations across the region, including missions supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The basing arrangement provides both parties with strategic value. The United States gains forward-positioned air power in a geographically optimal location — close to the Strait of Hormuz, within striking distance of multiple theatres, and supported by excellent infrastructure. Abu Dhabi gains an implicit security guarantee: the presence of American military personnel and assets on Abu Dhabi soil creates a de facto American commitment to the emirate’s defence.
The implicit guarantee is important precisely because it is not formalised in a mutual defence treaty. The United States has no treaty obligation to defend Abu Dhabi. But the presence of thousands of American military personnel at Al Dhafra creates a political reality in which any attack on Abu Dhabi would necessarily involve American casualties and trigger an American response. This is deterrence through presence rather than through legal commitment — and it has been effective.
THAAD Deployment and Missile Defence
The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the UAE marked a significant escalation in the bilateral defence relationship. THAAD provides the capability to intercept ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, offering a defensive layer against the ballistic missile threats from Iran that Abu Dhabi’s military planners consider the most likely vector of direct attack.
The THAAD deployment is operationally significant because it integrates Abu Dhabi into the American missile defence architecture. The system’s radar — one of the most powerful mobile radars in existence — provides detection and tracking capabilities that feed into the broader US regional surveillance picture. This integration creates mutual dependencies: the United States benefits from forward-positioned missile defence radar coverage; Abu Dhabi benefits from a defensive capability that it could not independently develop or deploy.
The Houthi missile and drone attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, which struck an ADNOC fuel depot and the airport construction area, demonstrated both the reality of the threat and the limitations of existing defences. The attacks prompted accelerated investment in integrated air and missile defence, including discussions about additional US systems and enhanced cooperation with Israeli defence technology following the Abraham Accords.
Intelligence Sharing
The intelligence relationship between Abu Dhabi and the United States operates at a level of depth and classification that is unusual for a non-NATO partner. The UAE’s intelligence services — including the Signal Intelligence Agency and the domestic security apparatus — share information with American counterparts on terrorism, regional threats, weapons proliferation, and the activities of state and non-state actors across the Middle East and Africa.
Abu Dhabi’s geographic position, its extensive business and diplomatic networks across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and its diaspora connections provide intelligence access that the United States values. In return, the American intelligence community shares assessments and technical intelligence that enhance Abu Dhabi’s situational awareness and threat detection capabilities.
The intelligence relationship also extends into the cyber domain. Abu Dhabi has invested heavily in cyber capabilities, and cooperation with American technology and intelligence firms has been a component of this investment. The boundaries of this cooperation — what technology is shared, what capabilities are developed, and how they are employed — are a recurring point of negotiation.
The Abraham Accords and US Mediation
The Abraham Accords normalisation agreement between the UAE and Israel, announced in August 2020, was brokered by the United States and represents one of the most significant diplomatic achievements involving all three parties in recent decades. For Abu Dhabi, normalisation formalised existing quiet cooperation with Israel and opened commercial, technology, and investment channels that had previously operated in the shadows.
The American role was essential. Washington provided the diplomatic framework, the political cover, and the incentive structure — including the proposed F-35 sale — that made normalisation possible. The Accords demonstrated that the United States retains the capacity to broker transformative agreements in the Middle East when its interests align with those of willing regional partners.
For Abu Dhabi’s economic vision, the Abraham Accords opened access to Israeli technology, particularly in areas such as agricultural technology, water management, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. Bilateral trade between the UAE and Israel has grown substantially since normalisation, and Israeli venture capital has begun flowing into Abu Dhabi’s technology ecosystem through Hub71 and other channels.
The durability of the Accords depends partly on continued American engagement. A US administration that deprioritises the Middle East or takes positions that undermine the Accords’ framework would reduce the diplomatic infrastructure supporting the normalised relationship — though the commercial and security logic connecting Abu Dhabi and Israel now has its own momentum independent of Washington.
Economic Interdependencies
The economic dimension of the Abu Dhabi-US relationship extends well beyond arms sales. Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth funds are among the largest foreign investors in the United States. ADIA maintains a substantial allocation to US equities, fixed income, real estate, and alternative investments, with estimated US exposure in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Mubadala’s US investment portfolio includes GlobalFoundries — the semiconductor manufacturer headquartered in Malta, New York — which represents one of the most strategically significant Gulf investments in American industry.
GlobalFoundries is particularly consequential because semiconductors sit at the intersection of economic value and national security. Mubadala’s ownership of a major American chipmaker gives Abu Dhabi direct exposure to the US semiconductor supply chain — and gives Washington a direct interest in Abu Dhabi’s technology partnerships and export control compliance. The investment creates leverage in both directions: Abu Dhabi is a major employer in the US semiconductor sector; the United States can influence the terms under which Abu Dhabi-owned semiconductor capacity operates.
ADQ and other Abu Dhabi entities have invested in US healthcare, food, logistics, and infrastructure assets. These investments create employment, generate tax revenue, and build constituencies within the United States that support the bilateral relationship. The investment relationship is, in this sense, a deliberate strategy: Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth funds invest in the United States partly because such investments generate economic and political returns that reinforce the security partnership.
American companies reciprocate. Major US defence contractors, energy companies, technology firms, and financial institutions operate in Abu Dhabi, contributing to the emirate’s economic diversification and human capital development. The bilateral investment relationship is genuinely bidirectional, creating interlocking interests that provide structural resilience.
G42, AI, and Technology Tensions
The G42 episode crystallises the tensions inherent in Abu Dhabi’s position between the United States and China. G42, an Abu Dhabi-based artificial intelligence and cloud computing conglomerate, maintained partnerships with both American and Chinese technology companies — a dual engagement that Washington found increasingly unacceptable as US-China technology competition intensified.
American concerns centred on the potential for Chinese access to advanced AI capabilities, data, and semiconductor technology through G42’s partnerships. Congressional scrutiny, intelligence community warnings, and diplomatic pressure created a choice point for Abu Dhabi: maintain the China technology relationship and risk the US defence and technology partnership, or restructure G42’s partnerships to align with American requirements.
Abu Dhabi chose alignment with Washington. G42 divested its Chinese technology partnerships, brought in American strategic partners including Microsoft, and restructured its operations to comply with US technology security expectations. The decision was pragmatic rather than ideological: the US technology ecosystem — including access to advanced semiconductors, cloud computing infrastructure, and AI research partnerships — was more valuable to Abu Dhabi’s long-term economic strategy than the Chinese alternative.
However, the G42 resolution established a precedent that constrains Abu Dhabi’s future technology partnerships. Washington demonstrated that it will use the defence relationship as leverage to influence Abu Dhabi’s technology choices. Abu Dhabi demonstrated that it will accommodate American demands when the cost-benefit calculation favours compliance — but the accommodation was reluctant, and future technology disputes remain likely as AI capabilities become more strategically consequential.
Investment Screening and CFIUS
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) increasingly scrutinises investments by Gulf sovereign wealth funds, including Abu Dhabi entities. CFIUS reviews assess whether foreign investments in US companies pose national security risks — and the expanding definition of national security to include technology, data, and supply chain considerations means that a growing share of Abu Dhabi’s US investment activity falls within CFIUS jurisdiction.
The practical implications are significant. Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth funds must factor CFIUS review timelines, conditions, and potential rejection into their US investment strategies. Investments in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, critical infrastructure, and companies holding sensitive personal data face heightened scrutiny. The compliance burden is not prohibitive, but it shapes deal flow and investment timing in ways that disadvantage foreign sovereign investors relative to domestic buyers.
The CFIUS dynamic also creates information asymmetries. The review process requires Abu Dhabi entities to disclose detailed information about their governance, investment objectives, and relationships with other entities — including potential connections to countries of concern. This disclosure requirement, while manageable, represents a form of strategic transparency that Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth funds would not voluntarily provide.
Bipartisan Support and Administration Variability
The Abu Dhabi-US relationship has historically enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington. Defence cooperation, counterterrorism, energy security, and sovereign wealth investment create constituencies in both parties. Defence contractors benefit from arms sales. Energy companies operate in Abu Dhabi. Financial institutions manage sovereign wealth fund mandates. Technology firms sell into Abu Dhabi’s digital transformation programmes. These economic interests generate political support that transcends partisan cycles.
However, the relationship is not immune to administration-specific policy shifts. Different US administrations have varied in their emphasis on human rights conditions, their approach to Iran, their willingness to engage in Middle East security commitments, and their tolerance for Abu Dhabi’s multi-vector foreign policy. An administration focused on human rights may impose conditions on arms sales. An administration pursuing Iran engagement may reduce the perceived value of the Gulf security partnership. An administration focused on great power competition may intensify pressure on Abu Dhabi’s China relationships.
The structural resilience of the relationship means that these shifts produce adjustments rather than ruptures. No US administration has seriously contemplated abandoning the security partnership with Abu Dhabi. But the intensity, warmth, and scope of cooperation fluctuate with the political cycle — and Abu Dhabi’s planners must maintain relationships across the American political spectrum to ensure continuity regardless of which party holds power.
Implications for Vision 2030
The United States relationship is foundational to Abu Dhabi’s economic vision in ways that extend beyond defence. American security guarantees underpin the regional stability that attracts foreign investment. US technology partnerships support Abu Dhabi’s AI, semiconductor, and digital economy ambitions. American institutional investors provide capital market depth. US regulatory frameworks set the standards that ADGM and Abu Dhabi’s financial infrastructure emulate.
The risk is that US-China competition forces Abu Dhabi into choices that constrain its economic optimisation. The G42 precedent suggests that when forced to choose between American and Chinese technology ecosystems, Abu Dhabi will choose America — but each such choice narrows the multi-vector strategy that Abu Dhabi’s leadership prefers. If technology competition expands to encompass additional sectors — energy technology, biotechnology, financial technology — the cumulative constraint on Abu Dhabi’s strategic flexibility could become significant.
The vision’s execution depends on maintaining the American security and technology partnership while preserving enough strategic autonomy to pursue economic relationships with China, India, and other partners. This is the central geopolitical challenge of the next decade — and its management will determine whether Vision 2030 achieves its full potential or operates within the boundaries set by great power competition.