Security as Economic Infrastructure
Gulf security is not a topic separate from economics. It is economic infrastructure. The stability of Abu Dhabi and Bahrain’s investment climates, the confidence of international businesses operating in the region, the flow of hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz, and the ability of both economies to execute long-term development visions all depend on a security architecture that prevents major conflict while managing persistent tensions.
This architecture is multilayered: bilateral security relationships with the United States, the GCC’s collective security mechanisms, indigenous defence capabilities, and the deterrent effects of strategic partnerships. Its effectiveness is demonstrated not by military victories but by the absence of the catastrophic scenarios that would derail economic development.
GCC Security Dynamics
The Gulf Cooperation Council, established in 1981 partly in response to the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, provides the institutional framework for collective Gulf security. The GCC’s security dimension includes the Peninsula Shield Force, intelligence sharing agreements, joint military exercises, and diplomatic coordination on shared threats.
In practice, GCC security cooperation is uneven. The 2017 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt demonstrated that intra-GCC disputes can disrupt the cooperative framework. The subsequent resolution and Qatar’s reintegration restored formal unity, but the episode revealed the fragility of collective security mechanisms when political disagreements between member states become acute.
For Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, the GCC security framework provides value primarily through coordination with Saudi Arabia. The bilateral Abu Dhabi-Saudi and Bahrain-Saudi security relationships are more operationally significant than the multilateral GCC mechanisms, which function better as diplomatic forums than as military command structures.
Shared Security Concerns
Abu Dhabi and Bahrain share several security concerns that shape their defence postures and geopolitical strategies:
Iran: The primary shared concern. Both Abu Dhabi and Bahrain view Iran as a destabilising force in the region — Abu Dhabi through the lens of maritime security and the potential for Iranian disruption of Gulf shipping, Bahrain through the more immediate concern of Iranian interference in domestic affairs. Defence spending, alliance strategies, and diplomatic postures in both capitals are significantly influenced by the Iranian threat.
Maritime security: The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of global oil supply transits, is a chokepoint vulnerability for both economies. Any military conflict or blockade affecting the Strait would have immediate and severe economic consequences for Abu Dhabi (as a major oil exporter) and Bahrain (as an island economy dependent on maritime trade). The US Fifth Fleet and multinational maritime forces patrol these waters specifically to address this vulnerability.
Terrorism and asymmetric threats: Both economies face risks from non-state actors and asymmetric attack methods — drone strikes, cyber attacks, and unconventional warfare tactics that state-based deterrence does not fully address. The 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure demonstrated the vulnerability of Gulf energy assets to asymmetric threats.
Political instability: Regional conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya create security externalities that affect the Gulf, including refugee flows, terrorist recruitment, and proxy warfare dynamics. Abu Dhabi and Bahrain have both been affected by regional instability, directly through military involvement and indirectly through the security posture it requires.
Defence Cooperation
Abu Dhabi and Bahrain maintain defence cooperation through multiple channels:
US partnerships: Both maintain significant defence relationships with the United States, including arms procurement, joint training, military-to-military engagement, and basing agreements (the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, various US military presence agreements with Abu Dhabi).
Bilateral cooperation: Abu Dhabi and Bahrain cooperate on intelligence sharing, border security, and joint exercises. The GCC framework facilitates this cooperation, though bilateral channels are often more efficient.
Indigenous capabilities: Abu Dhabi has invested heavily in building indigenous defence capabilities through EDGE Group, while Bahrain maintains a smaller but capable defence force. Both economies recognise that external security partnerships must be supplemented by domestic military capability.
Defence procurement: Both Abu Dhabi and Bahrain are significant defence importers, procuring advanced weapons systems, surveillance technology, and military equipment from the United States, Europe, and other suppliers. Defence procurement decisions have both security and diplomatic dimensions — arms purchases reinforce alliance relationships while building military capability.
Implications for the Investment Climate
The Gulf security architecture directly affects the investment climate in both economies. International investors, financial institutions, and corporations assess geopolitical risk as a component of their jurisdictional decisions. The questions they ask are straightforward: Is this jurisdiction stable? Is there a credible risk of conflict? Are my assets and personnel safe?
For Abu Dhabi, the answers are generally reassuring. The emirate has not experienced direct military conflict, its security forces are capable, its US alliance provides deterrence, and its sovereign wealth provides financial resilience. The investment risk premium associated with Gulf security concerns is present but moderate.
For Bahrain, the security risk assessment is more nuanced. The 2011 unrest, the proximity to Iran, the sectarian dynamic, and the kingdom’s smaller defence capabilities create a risk profile that is measurably higher than Abu Dhabi’s. The Fifth Fleet mitigates but does not eliminate these concerns.
Outlook
The Gulf security architecture through 2030 will be tested by the trajectory of US-Iran relations, the evolution of great power competition in the region, the stability of energy markets, and the capacity of GCC institutions to manage intra-Gulf disagreements without fracturing the collective security framework.
For both Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, the critical security variable is whether the current equilibrium — persistent tension managed through deterrence, alliances, and diplomacy without major conflict — can be sustained. If it can, both economies have the security foundation to execute their economic visions. If it cannot — if a major conflict erupts in the Gulf — all economic planning becomes secondary to crisis management.